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Reality and Humean Supervenience

eBook - Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis

Erschienen am 15.07.2002, Auflage: 1/2002
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Bibliografische Daten
ISBN/EAN: 9780585385631
Sprache: Englisch
Umfang: 264 S.
E-Book
Format: EPUB
DRM: Adobe DRM

Beschreibung

If asked what Humeanism could mean today, there is no other philosopher to turn to whose work covers such a wide range of topics from a unified Humean perspective as that of David Lewis. The core of Lewis's many contributions to philosophy, including his work in philosophical ontology, intensional logic and semantics, probability and decision theory, topics within philosophy of science as well as a distinguished philosophy of mind, can be understood as the development of philosophical position that is centered around his conception of Humean supervenience. If we accept the thesis that it is physical science and not philosophical reasoning that will eventually arrive at the basic constituents of all matter pertaining to our world, then Humean supervenience is the assumption that all truths about our world will supervene on the class of physical truths in the following sense: There are no truths in any compartment of our world that cannot be accounted for in terms of differences and similarities among those properties and external space-time relations that are fundamental to our world according to physical science.

Autorenportrait

Gerhard Preyer is professor of social science at J. W. Goethe University in Frankfurt. Frank Siebelt is professor of philosophy at J. W. Goethe University in Frankfurt.

Inhalt

Chapter 1 Modal RealismChapter 2 Island Universes and the Analysis of ModalityChapter 3 Time Travel FictionChapter 4 Counting the Cost of Modal RealismChapter 5 Against Against Overlap and EnduranceChapter 6 The Case for PerduranceChapter 7 Physicalism, Causation, and ConditionalsChapter 8 Naturalism for the Faint of HeartChapter 9 Going through the Open Door Again: Counterfactual vs. Singularist theories of CausationChapter 10 On Forward and Backward Counterfactual ConditionsChapter 11 Reduction of MindChapter 12 Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of MindChapter 13 Knowing What It Is like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge ArgumentChapter 14 IndexChapter 15 Reality and Humean Supervenience: Some Essays on David Lewis's Philosophy

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