PREFACE xvii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xxvii
PART I INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1
1 Advanced Materials Innovation: An Overview 3
1.1 The Advanced Materials Revolution, 3
1.2 The Economic Impact of Advanced Materials, 6
1.2.1 Information and Computer Technology, 8
1.2.2 Energy, 9
1.2.3 Biotechnology and Health Care, 10
1.2.4 Transportation, 11
1.2.5 Construction, Infrastructure, and Manufacturing, 12
1.3 Advanced Material Innovation: The Main Players, 13
References, 15
PART II STRUCTURAL MATERIALS: METALS AND POLYMERS 17
2 Advanced Casting Technology: Ultrathin Steel and the Microalloys 19
2.1 Introduction, 19
2.2 Background, 20
2.2.1 Thick Slab Casting and Big Steel, 20
2.2.2 The Mini- and Micromill Revolution: Thin Slab and Thin Strip Casting, 21
2.2.3 Ultrathin Steel and Microalloys, 22
2.3 Nucor Steel: Ground Zero for the Mini (and Micro-)-Mill Revolution, 23
2.3.1 Nucors Flexible Structure, 24
2.3.2 Ken Iverson and Nucor, 24
2.3.3 Nucor Builds a Steel Minimill, 25
2.4 Thin Slab and Thin Strip Casting: Research and Development, 27
2.4.1 Thin Slab Casting, 27
2.4.2 Thin Strip Casting, 28
2.5 Thin Slab and Thin Strip Casting: Scale-Up, 30
2.5.1 The Challenges of Scaling, 30
2.5.2 Nucor and Reducing the Risks of Scaling, 31
2.5.2.1 Structural Risks, 31
2.5.2.2 Resource Risks: Capital, Raw Materials, and Labor, 32
2.5.2.3 Experiential Risks, 34
2.6 Thin Slab and Thin Strip Casting: Commercialization, 34
2.6.1 Commercializing the Thin Slab Process: Nucors Internalized Static Culture and Technology Selection, 35
2.6.2 Commercializing the Thin Strip Process: Nucor Creates a Dynamic Expansionist Culture, 36
References, 38
3 High-Pressure Technology and Duponts Synthetic Fiber Revolution 41
3.1 Background: The High-Pressure Process and Advanced Materials, 42
3.1.1 The Nature of High-Pressure Synthesis, 42
3.1.2 DuPont: High-Pressure Synthesis and Its Road to Advanced Fibers, 44
3.1.2.1 DuPonts Diversification Strategy, 44
3.1.2.2 DuPont Enters Uponand Struggles withHigh-Pressure Synthesis, 45
3.1.2.3 Roger Williams and the First-Generation High-Pressure Chemicals, 47
3.2 Duponts Nylon Revolution, 48
3.2.1 Charles Stine and DuPonts Central Research Department, 49
3.2.2 Stine Finds His Star Scientist: Wallace Carothers, 51
3.2.3 Carothers and Nylon, 53
3.2.3.1 Nylon: Research Phase, 53
3.2.3.2 Nylon: Development, Scale-Up, and Commercialization, 56
3.3 Nylons Children: Orlon and Dacron, 60
3.3.1 Orlon, 61
3.3.1.1 Orlon: Research Phase, 61
3.3.1.2 Orlon: Development Phase, 63
3.3.1.3 Orlon: Scale-Up and Commercialization, 64
3.3.2 Dacron, 65
3.3.2.1Dacron: Research Phase, 65
3.3.2.2 Dacron: Development, 66
3.3.2.3 Dacron: Scale-Up and Commercialization, 67
References, 68
4 Low-Temperature (Interfacial) Polymerization: DuPonts Specialty Fibers Versus General Electrics Polycarbonate Revolution 71
4.1 Introduction and Background, 72
4.2 Dupont and Specialty Fibers, 74
4.2.1 Lycra Spandex and the Block Copolymers, 75
4.2.2 Kevlar and the Aramids, 77
4.3 General Electric and the Polycarbonates, 80
4.3.1 The Polycarbonates: Research Phase, 80
4.3.2 The Polycarbonates: Development and Scale-Up, 82
4.3.3 The Polycarbonates: Commercialization PhaseGE Research Shifts from an Internally Directed to Externally Oriented Culture, 85
4.3.3.1 The Patent Issue, 86
4.3.3.2 The Customer Issue, 87
References, 88
5 Fluidization I: From Advanced Fuels to the Polysilicones 91
5.1 Background: Fluidization and Advanced Fuels, 91
5.1.1 Sun Oil and the Houdry Process, 92
5.1.2 Jersey Standard and the Fluidization Process, 94
5.2 General Electric and the Polysilicones, 100
5.2.1 The Silicones: Initiation Phase, 100
5.2.2 The Silicones: Research Phase, 101
5.2.2.1 Early Research, 101
5.2.2.2 Later Research, 102
5.2.3 The Silicones: Development Phase, 103
5.2.3.1 Early Development, 103
5.2.3.2 Later Development, 105
5.2.4 The Silicones: Commercialization Phase, 107
5.2.4.1 Patents, 108
5.2.4.2 Internal Use Versus External Customers, 108
References, 112
6 Fluidization II: Polyethylene, the Unipol Process, and the Metallocenes 115
6.1 Background: Polyethylene and the Dupont Problem, 116
6.1.1 DuPont and the Polychemicals Department, 116
6.1.2 DuPont and Delrin Plastic, 117
6.1.3 DuPont and Polyethylene, 118
6.1.3.1 European Developments, 118
6.1.3.2 DuPont and the One Polyethylene Strategy, 120
6.1.3.3 DuPont and the High-Density Polyethylene Problem, 121
6.1.3.4 DuPont and Fluidization, 122
6.2 Union Carbide and the Polyolefins: The Unipol Process, 122
6.2.1 Union Carbide and Polyethylene: Background, 123
6.2.2 The Unipol Process: Initiation Phase, 125
6.2.3 The Unipol Process: Research Phase, 127
6.2.3.1 The Unipol Process: Development and Scale-Up Phases, 129
6.2.4 The Unipol Process: Commercialization Phase, 133
6.3 The Unipol Revolution and the Metallocene Polymers, 137
6.3.1 Science and Technology of the Metallocenes, 137
6.3.2 The Metallocene Era and Advanced Materials, 138
References, 139
PART III FUNCTIONAL MATERIALS: SEMICONDUCTORS 143
7 Advanced Materials and the Integrated Circuit I: The Metal-on-Silicon (MOS) Process 145
7.1 Background, 146
7.1.1 The Vacuum Tube and Advanced Materials, 146
7.2 Bell Labs and the Point-Contact Transistor, 148
7.2.1 Bell Labs: The Early Years, 148
7.2.2 Bell Semiconductor Research: The Leading Players, 150
7.2.3 The Point-Contact Transistor, 152
7.3 Shockley Semiconductor and the Junction Transistor, 156
7.3.1 The Junction (Bipolar) Transistor, 156
7.3.2 The Creation and Fall of Shockley Semiconductor, 159
7.4 Fairchild Semiconductor: The Bipolar Company, 160
7.4.1 The Silicon Transistor, 160
7.4.2 The Planar Process, 162
7.4.3 The Integrated Circuit, 163
7.5 The MOS Technology at Bell and Fairchild, 165
7.5.1 MOS Research at Bell Labs, 165
7.5.2 MOS Research and Development at Fairchild, 168
7.5.2.1 The Fairchild MOS Project: Initiation, Research, and Early Development, 168
7.5.2.2 Development and Early Attempts at Scale-Up: Risk Analysis, 169
References, 176
8 Advanced Materials and the Integrated Circuit II: The Silicon Gate ProcessThe Memory Chip and the Microprocessor 179
8.1 Background: Creating Intel, 180
8.2 The MOS-SG Process: Research and Early Development, 182
8.3 The MOS-SG Process: Development PhasePerfecting the Process, 182
8.4 The MOS-SG Process: Product Development, 185
8.4.1 MOS-SG and Memory I: The DRAM, 185
8.4.2 MOS-SG and Memory II: The EPROM, 187
8.4.3 MOS-SG and the Microprocessor, 189
8.4.3.1 Ted Hoff, Circuit Design, and Inventing the Microprocessor, 189
8.4.3.2 Federico Faggin, the MOS-SG Process, and Making the Microprocessor, 190
8.4.3.3 The Competitive Advantage of Intels Microprocessor, 191
8.4.3.4 Championing the Microprocessor at Intel, 192
8.5 MOS-SG: Scale-Up and Commercialization, 194
8.5.1 Competition and Resource Allocation, 196
8.5.2 The MOS-SG Process, Moores Law, and Intels Internalized Short-Term Dynamic Culture, 197
References, 200
9 The Epitaxial Process I: Bell Labs and the Semiconductor Laser 203
9.1 Background: Advanced Materials, the Epitaxial Process, and Nonsilicon-based Microchips, 204
9.2 Bell Labs and the Semiconductor Laser, 206
9.2.1 The First Lasers, 207
9.2.2 Early Research on the Semiconductor Laser in the United States, 210
9.2.3 Bells Semiconductor Laser: Initiation and Research, 211
9.2.4 Bells Semiconductor Laser: Development, 212
9.2.4.1 Toward a Working Prototype, 213
9.2.4.2 Resource Problems and Creative Bootstrapping, 214
9.2.4.3 Development of the Semiconductor Laser Gains Importance at AT&T/Bell Labs, 215
9.2.4.4 The Million-Hour Laser, 217
9.2.5 Bells Semiconductor Laser: Scale-Up and Commercialization, 218
9.2.5.1 The Semiconductor Laser Advances to Higher Wavelengths, 218
9.2.5.2 Bell Faces Competition, 220
References, 221
10 The Epitaxial Process II: IBM and the SiliconGermanium (SiGe) Chip 223
10.1 IBM and its research, 224
10.2 IBM and the SiliconGermanium Chip, 226
10.2.1 The SiliconGermanium Chip: Initiation and Research Phases, 226
10.2.1.1 A Question of Temperature, 228
10.2.1.2 A Question of Layering: Molecular Beams Versus Chemical Vapor Deposition, 229
10.2.1.3 The Germanium Solution, 230
10.2.2 The SiliconGermanium Chip: Development Phase, 231
10.2.2.1 Internal Competition, 231
10.2.2.2 Grappling with a Shifting Context and Shrinking Resources, 233
10.2.2.3 Dealing with a Dynamic Market, 235
10.2.3 The SiliconGermanium Chip: Scale-Up and Commercialization, 235
10.2.3.1 Integrating the SiliconGermanium Chip into IBMs Production Process, 235
10.2.3.2 Finding New Markets, 236
10.2.3.3 Creating New Strategies, 237
References, 239
PART IV HYBRID MATERIALS AND NEW FORMS OF MATTER: LIQUID CRYSTALS AND NANOMATERIALS243
11 Product-Oriented Materials I: Liquid Crystals and Small LC Displaysthe Electronic Calculator and the Digital Watch 245
11.1 Background, 246
11.2 RCA and Liquid Crystal Research, 248
11.2.1 The Liquid Crystal Display: Initiation and Research at RCA, 248
11.2.1.1 Richard Williams and His Liquid Crystal Domains, 248
11.2.1.2 George Heilmeier and His Two Modes of Liquid Crystal Action, 249
11.2.1.3 The Search for Room-Temperature Liquid Crystals, 251
11.2.1.4 The First Experimental Displays, 252
11.2.2 The Liquid Crystal Display: (Attempts at) Development at RCA, 252
11.2.2.1 Weakening Influence of the Sarnoff Labs, 252
11.2.2.2 Search for a Business Unit, 253
11.2.2.3 Loss of the Champion, 255
11.3 Small LCD Development, Scale-up, and Commercialization I: US Start-ups Spin-off, 255
11.4 Europe and Liquid Crystals, 259
11.5 Small LCD Development, Scale-up, and Commercialization II: Japan, 260
11.5.1 The Sharp Corporation and the LCD Pocket Calculator, 261
11.5.2 The Seiko Corporation and the Digital Watch, 265
References, 268
12 Product-oriented Materials II: Liquid Crystals, Thin-Film Transistors, and Large LC DisplaysFlat-screen Televisions and Personal Computers 271
12.1 Background, 272
12.2 TFTs: Initiation, Research, and Early Development, 273
12.2.1 The United States: Westinghouse and TFTs, 273
12.2.2 Europe: New Forms of Silicon and TFTs, 276
12.3 Large LCDs: Development, Scale-up, and Commercialization, 276
12.3.1 Large LC Display Start-Up and Spin-Off Ventures in the United States, 277
12.3.2 Japan Enters into Large LC Displays, 278
12.3.2.1 Flat-Panel (Hang-on-the-Wall) TVs, 278
12.3.2.2 Computer Displays: Joint USJapanese Cooperation, 281
References, 284
13 Nanomaterials: The Promise and the Challenge 287
13.1 Background, 287
13.1.1 Nanomaterials, 288
13.1.2 Nanotubes, 289
13.2 Nanotubes: Discovery and Early Research, 291
13.2.1 Early Research, 291
13.2.1.1 A Question of Space Dust, 291
13.2.1.2 Richard Smalley, Clusters, and the AP2 Machine, 293
13.2.1.3 Chance Discovery of a New Form of Matter: C60 and the Buckyball, 295
13.3 Nanotubes: Later Research and Early Development, 298
13.3.1 A Small Buckyball Factory in Germany, 299
13.3.2 Smalley Reenters the Fray: An Entrepreneurial Vision, 300
13.3.3 The Laser Oven Stopgap, 302
13.3.4 The HiPco Solution: Fluidization and Nanomaterials, 303
13.4 Nanotubes: Later Development and Scale-up, 303
13.4.1 Technology Transfer: From Rice University to Carbon Nanotechnologies Inc., 303
13.4.1.1 CNI and Its Pilot Plant, 304
13.4.1.2 SWNTs and Their Problems, 305
13.5 Nanotubescommercialization: The Case of Bayer Materials Science, 308
References, 311
PART V CONCLUSION 315
14 Risks, Champions, and Advanced Materials Innovation 317
14.1 The Major Task Milestones in Advanced Materials Creation, 318
14.2 Underground Versus Aboveground Advanced Materials Innovation, 320
14.2.1 Underground Versus Aboveground Innovation, Strategic Context, and the Major Task Milestones, 321
14.2.2 Underground Versus Aboveground Innovation: Firm and Project Characteristics, 325
14.3 Underground Advanced Materials Creation: General Electric and Union Carbide, 327
14.4 Aboveground Advanced Materials Creation and the Gauntlet of Risks, 330
14.4.1 Phase I: InitiationRelevancy Risks, 337
14.4.2 Phase II: Early ResearchIntellectual Risks, 347
14.4.3 Phase III: Late ResearchResource Minimization Risks, 363
14.4.4 Phase IV: Early DevelopmentPrototyping Risks, 364
14.4.5 Phase V: Late DevelopmentTechnologyMarket Interaction Risks, 371
14.4.6 Phase VI: Scale-Up PhaseScaling Risks, 389
14.4.7 Phase VII: Commercialization PhaseCultural-Strategic Risks, 390
14.5 The Structural Context and Advanced Materials Innovation, 419
14.6 Inventors and Champions, 422
14.6.1 Inventors, Champions, and the Gauntlet of Risks, 423
14.7 The Different Types of Advanced Materials Champions, 433
14.8 Final Thoughts and Implications, 438
14.8.1 Implications for Companies and Investors, 441
14.8.2 Implications for Government, 443
14.8.3 A Global Perspective, 444
References, 446
INDEX 449
