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Laws of Form

The New Edition of this Classic with the first-ever Proof of Riemann's Hypothesi

Erschienen am 01.02.2009
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Bibliografische Daten
ISBN/EAN: 9783890945804
Sprache: Englisch
Umfang: 240
Auflage: 1. Auflage

Beschreibung

Laws of Form by G Spencer-Brown new English edition: At last this all-time classic has been reset, allowing more detailed explanations and fresh insight. There are seven appendices, doubling the size of the original book. This new edition of G Spencer-Browns all-time classic comes with previously unreleased work on prime numbers as well as on the four-colour theorem. Most exiting of all is the first ever proof of the famous Riemann hypothesis. To have, in print, under your hands and before your own eyes, what defied the best minds for a century and a half, is an experience not to be denied. Preface to the new English edition As is now well known, Laws of Form took ten years from its inception to its publication, four years to write it and six years of political intrigue to get it published. Typically of all unheralded best sellers from relatively obscure authors, it was turned down by six publishers, including Mark Longman who published my earlier work on probability. Even Sir Stanley Unwin refused to publish it until his best author, Bertrand Russell, told him he must. This crucial recommendation was not achieved without intrigue, and required me (not unwillingly) to sleep with one of Russell's granddaughters, who asked me in the morning, 'What exactly do you want from Bertie?' 'To endorse what he said about the book when he first read it in typescript,' I told her. 'He never will!' she exclaimed. 'You'll have to twist his arm, you'll have to blackmail him. How can I help?' The next few years were spent in vigorous arm-twisting and incessant blackmail from us both. One of her threats was to invite me to Plas Penrhyn as her guest while Bertie and Edith were away in London. This sent Bertie into a paroxysm of terror of what the neighbours might think. He also had an irrational fear of spoiling his reputation as a mathematician, which was not good anyway, by recommending a book that had not yet been tried by the critics. He seemed totally unaware that any book he recommended, however ridiculous, would have no effect whatever on this. When we finally got him cornered, in my next visit to Plas Penrhyn, he carefully avoided mentioning the subject during the whole of my stay, and I considered it too dangerous to mention it myself. The next morning I was due to depart while Bertie and Edith were still in bed, and I thought I had failed miserably. But no! I missed my train because they had not ordered me a taxi to the station, which was their way of telling me that my visit was to be prolonged by another day. The evening of this extra day came, and still nothing was mentioned. Ten o' clock bedtime arrived, and I thought I had failed again, when Bertie suddenly said, 'What exactly do you want of me?' 'To endorse what you said about the book three years ago,' I told him. 'You must remind me what it was,' he said. I produced a verbatim report of his remarks, neatly typed out, and thrust it in his face. 'Are you sure this is all you want?' he said. 'Don't you want me to write a detailed introduction to the work, as I did for Wittgenstein?' I told him that that would be very nice, but that this was all I needed just now. He contemplated the page of typescript for a moment, and then a wicked gleam lit up his face, and he rubbed his hands. 'Supposing I don't?' he grinned. 'Then,' I heard myself saying, 'it might delay the publication for a year or so, but the book will still be published in the end, and you won't be associated with it.' 'Oh,' he said. 'I never thought of that. How would you like me to sign it?' There is no stronger mathematical law than the law of complementarity. A thing is defined by its complement, i.e. by what it is not. And its complement is defined by its uncomplement, i.e. by the thing itself, but this time thought of differently, as having got outside of itself to view itself as an object, i.e. 'objectively', and then gone back into itself to see itself as the subject of its object, i.e. 'subject

Autorenportrait

InhaltsangabeContents: Preface to the fifth English Edition Preface to the first American edition Preface Introduction A note on the mathematical approach 1 The form 2 Forms taken out of the form 3 The conception of calculation 4 The primary arithmetic 5 A calculus taken out of the calculus 6 The primary algebra 7 Theorems of the second order 8 Reuniting the two orders 9 Completeness 10 Independence 11 Equations of the second degree 12 Reentry into the form Notes Appendix 1. Proofs of Sheffer's postulates Appendix 2. The calculus interpreted for logic Index of references Index of forms Appendix 3. Bertrand Russell and the Laws of Form Introduction to Appendices 4 & 5 Appendix 4. An algebra for the natural numbers Appendix 5. Two proofs of the four-colour map theorem My simplest proof of the four-colour map theorem Appendix 6. Last word Appendix 7. The prime limit theorem Appendix 8. Primes between squares Appendix 9. A proof of Riemann's hypothesis via Denjoy's equivalent theorem Closing remarks

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